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ABSTRACT
This paper develops a model in which upstream network “insiders” conduct relationship specific
investment that induces the downstream firm to transact within networks. The scale of destination-
country production and part-specific measures of the importance of network relationships and
engineering costs are used to explain the pattern of U.S. auto parts exports.  Our results support the
prediction that large scale promotes relationship-specific investment and reduces imports. Also, while
Japan is a large parts importer, the composition of its imports is shifted away from parts where
vertical keiretsu are prominent. Nations hosting U.S.-owned automakers import more U.S. parts.
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Despite decades of tariff reductions and infrequent use of contingent protection, many ob-
servers continue to regard the Japanese market as “closed” to foreigners. In support of this
claim, they point to persistent trade surpluses and a relatively low import to GDP ratio (7%
in 1999). Since formal trade barriers seem too small to explain the alleged lack of market ac-
cess, commentators point instead to special business practices. As noted by the World Trade
Organization’s 1998TradePolicyReview, “Concernremains about the effects onforeign access
to Japan of horizontally and vertically integrated groups (kigyo-shudan and keiretsu).”
Keiretsu are well-known and controversial but not the only business networks with the
potential to inﬂuence international trade. Rauch’s (2001) recent survey discusses the trade-
creating activities of networks comprising members of ethnic groups and afﬁliates of multi-
national corporations. Rauch describes how such networks promote trade by disseminating
information on market opportunities and the trustworthiness of potential trade partners.
An additional role seems relevant for vertical networks: the facilitation of investment by
upstream ﬁrms that generates beneﬁts for downstream ﬁrms.
This paper investigates the role of business networks in trade by examining the pat-
tern of U.S. auto parts exports to 26 countries from 1989 to 1994. We develop the model
of Spencer and Qiu (2001) that identiﬁes vertical networks as arising from the decision of
suppliers to conduct relationship-speciﬁc investment. The theory contains implications for
trade by identifying the parts likely to be produced within the network and those likely to
be procured at arms-length from “outsiders.” We ﬁnd evidence consistent with the model’s
proposition that alager scale of local production reduces imports by encouraging local insid-
ers to conduct relationship-speciﬁc investment. Our results indicate that Japan’s imports of
1a part tend to be lower for parts where vertical keiretsu are prominent. On average, though,
Japan imports more parts from the U.S. than one would expect from its observed economic
characteristics. We also ﬁnd higher imports by countries with a larger amount of production
by U.S. automobile afﬁliates—especially for parts with high engineering costs.
Our study contributes to thedebateon whetherJapan’simports are“too low”andwhether
vertical keiretsu are exclusionary. Lawrence (1993) cites studies showing that Japanese manu-
facturing imports are lower than the levels predicted by trade models. Moreover, Lawrence
(1991) ﬁnds that import penetration decreases in Japan with increases in the share of both
horizontal and vertical keiretsu sales across industries. Fung (1991) reports a negative rela-
tionship between U.S. exports to Japan and the combined share of horizontal and vertical
keiretsu sales. Saxonhouse (1993) identiﬁes problems in the papers supporting the Lawrence
position and presents his own evidence showing that Japan’s distinctive trade structure can
be explained by its pattern of factor endowments.
Saxonhouse also points out that any import-reducing effects of keiretsu may to be due to
efﬁciency rather than collusion. The Spencer and Qiu (2001) model provides a theoretical
basis for networks as a vehicle for increasing efﬁciency. They argue that U.S. ﬁrms ﬁnd
it difﬁcult to sell intermediate goods in Japan because keiretsu suppliers make efﬁciency-
enhancing investments in parts that strongly beneﬁt from relationship-speciﬁc investment.
Miwa and Ramseyer (2000) review the theoretical and empirical work on the economic
role of relationship-speciﬁc investment and keiretsu in the automobile industry. Counter-
ing views to the contrary expressed by Asanuma (1989) and Aoki (1988), they argue that
relationship-speciﬁc investment and extra-contractual governance mechanisms do not ap-
pear to play important interrelated roles in Japan’s automobile industry. Further argu-
2ments downplaying the role of relationship-speciﬁc investment are provided by Casadesus-
Masanell and Spulber (2000) who ﬁnd that General Motor’s acquisition of Fisher Body was
not an effort to avoid opportunism in the presence of asset speciﬁc investment. However,
other research provides empirical evidenceshowing that U.S.automakers tend to internalize
the production of parts for which relationship-speciﬁc investment is important. Monteverde
and Teece (1982), the source of some of the data used in this study, ﬁnd that the likelihood
that General Motors and Ford produce a part in-house is positively associated with the engi-
neering costs of part development and a measure of model-speciﬁcity. Klier (1994) and Mas-
ten, Meehan, and Snyder (1989) also conclude that concerns about opportunism inﬂuence
the vertical integration decisions of U.S. automakers. We extend this literature by testing the
implications of our model linking the decision to conduct relationship-speciﬁc investment
to international trade.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 models how ex-post bargaining with an as-
sembler affects the incentive of a parts supplier to make relationship-speciﬁc investments.
It predicts that network ﬁrms will only produce parts for which the marginal product of
relationship-speciﬁc investment exceeds a critical level with “outsiders” supplying the re-
maining parts. Section 3 describes our data set on U.S. exports of 53 different vehicle parts
to 26 importing countries over the period 1989 to 1994. We present and interpret the econo-
metric results in section 4. Finally, section 5 summarizes the implications of these results for
our understanding business networks.
32 A Model of Vertical Networks
The model is an adaptation of Spencer and Qiu (2001).1 An automaker chooses between
purchasing parts from a member of its “network” or from independent ﬁrms. We will refer
to the former as “insiders” and the latter as “outsiders.”
Insider suppliers have an advantage because, based on long-term relationships, they can
make relationship-speciﬁc investments, referred to as RSI, so as to reduce the cost of as-
sembly for the maker. This cost reduction applies only to the maker for which the part is
designed and not for other makers. Membership of the network is necessary for these in-
vestments because of the need for a very high level of information concerning not only the
design of the part itself, but also with the way the part can be modiﬁed to better ﬁt with
other connecting parts in the assembly process.2 In addition to insiders, there are a large
number of potential outsider suppliers that can not undertake RSI for the maker and hence
are able to supply “generic” parts at competitive prices based on their cost of production
plus transport costs. Despite the advantage of RSI conducted by insiders, the maker may
nevertheless select outsiders because of their potentially lower cost of production.
For simplicity, we present the analysis for a representative maker with an exogenously
set output of cars, denoted
 . This will allow us to focus on the cost minimization prob-
lem associated with sourcing components without fully specifying the downstream product
market.3
A large number,
 , of parts is required to produce an auto, with parts and labour com-
1Qiu and Spencer (2002) also extend this model to examine the effects of trade policy aimed at opening the
Japanese market.
2Branstetter (2000) ﬁnds strong empirical evidence for the importance of the ﬂow of technological informa-
tion within vertical keiretsu in enhancing efﬁciency.
3SpencerandQiu’s (2001)speciﬁcationof theproductmarketforcarsasaCournot duopoly with segmented
markets reveals that the main insights of the model are robust to relaxing the single assembler assumption.
4bined in ﬁxed proportion in ﬁnal assembly. Each assembled auto requires
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This functional form implies that higher levels of RSI create more rent for the maker, but at
a decreasing rate.
We exploit the fact that
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ranking of parts—may vary internationally so as to capture country-speciﬁc differences in
the efﬁcacy of RSI. For example, if the nature of institutions and culture in Japan would
better facilitate the kind of information transfer that enhances RSI, then
 




￿ represent the constant unit cost of production of part
  for insiders. Outsiders









￿ include all relevant transport costs to the maker’s facility (as well as tariffs if the part
5is imported). We deﬁne










Note that this cost advantage does not include the rent generated by RSI. We assume for
simplicity that
Æ is constant across parts.4
Although parts can be produced more cheaply by outsiders, the maker can gain from
the local purchase of part
  from an insider supplier due to the effect of RSI in reducing
assembly costs. Supposing that part
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An important aspect of RSI is that the supplier cannot be guaranteed a return based on a
contract that is conditional on the amount,
 
￿, of investment. This is due to the difﬁculty of
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￿, which would include non-observable costs (or at least non-veriﬁable
by courts), such as the costs of obtaining the information and coordination with other sup-
pliers. Consequently, we assume that the investment,
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each supplier and the maker as to the price,
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empirical speciﬁcation could also accommodate
Æ that varies across parts in the part ﬁxed effects.
6The order of moves is as follows: At stage 1, each supplier




￿, and simultaneously the maker speciﬁes its output,
 . Since each ﬁrm sets its choice
variable to maximize own proﬁt taking the other choice variables as given, this gives rise
to a Nash equilibrium in
 
￿ and
 . In making these decisions, the maker and its suppliers
correctly anticipate the outcome of the stage 2 bargaining process determining the prices,
 
￿,
for parts. We assume the maker will at least break even, but suppliers have to consider the
possibility that, if the agreed upon price is too low, RSI at stage 1 could result in a loss. At
stage 2, the maker engages in Nash bargaining over the price,
 
￿, simultaneously with each
remaining supplier. If an agreement is reached with the supplier of part




  parts needed to produce output
 . Otherwise, the maker buys the same quantity of
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  from an outsider ﬁrm.
The maker’s marginal cost due to part
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at a price of
 
￿
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￿, bargaining breaks down, the maker sources part
  from outsiders, and the










￿, if they are to obtain a proﬁt in stage 2. And, since suppliers
would not do RSI without an expected proﬁt, it is actually beneﬁcial to the maker to have
less than complete bargaining power.
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￿ from (4), it is possible that revenue would not be sufﬁcient to cover
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hence would lead to a loss. In that case supplier
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the closed form for local suppler proﬁts by substituting the solutions for
  and
  from (4)






























8From this equation it is apparent that the greater is
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Figure 1: The determination of which parts are sourced from insiders







￿ are ordered along the X-axis in terms of
increasing
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9thetical reduction in assembler costs if the supplier chose
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supplier anticipates that bargaining will break down and it will suffer a loss equal to the
amount of RSI (
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Æ (the horizontal dashed line) cross at
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￿ is not sufﬁcient to cover the cost of RSI, with the outcome that
these parts are sourced from outsiders. Proﬁt is zero (the




which is the lowest value of RSI importance at which insiders can expect to break even. Each
supplier
  will commit to its RSI and choose to produce for
 
￿









The implications of this model for trade depend on the locations of insiders and out-
siders. The basic hypothesis used to develop the empirical speciﬁcation is that insiders
include local parts suppliers producing in the same country as the automaker. In particular,
members of vertical keiretsu in Japan are viewed as insiders with respect to the production
of auto parts for makers in Japan, but there may also be local vertical networks in other
countries. This insider categorization is based on the logic that the information needed to
design a part for a particular car model requires geographic proximity between upstream
and downstream ﬁrms. However, we also consider the possibility that the coordination re-
quired for RSI can occur over longer distances if mediated by a multinational enterprise.
Thus a supplier in the U.S. might be an insider when it transacts with a U.S. multinational
ﬁrm operating a foreign market. Taking into account these two possibilities, the U.S. parts
producers that export to non-U.S. car makers located abroad would be outsiders in these
10transactions. The empirical section will provide a test of the validity of these views of the
boundaries of networks.
Since, as currently speciﬁed, the model predicts either zero sourcing of part




  units, for the empirical speciﬁcation, we adapt the model to reﬂect the
greater continuity in export levels that we observe in the trade data. This involves relaxing
our assumption of a representative maker so as to introduce heterogeneity across makers
within each country as to whether to use a local insider or an outsider as a source for each
part. Thus due to differences in characteristics, one maker might be using local insiders
for a given part
 , while another uses outsiders for the same part. Consequently each part
will have a probability of being sourced from a local insider, leading to non-zero import
probabilities for all parts.








￿, varies randomly across the makers in each country. Since
 
￿, the costs of insiders, and
 
￿
￿, the delivered price charged by outsiders, are both likely to vary across countries, we add
  subscripts to identify the location of production. To determine the effect of variation in
Æ
￿ on the value of parts imported by country
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  subscripts to reﬂect cross-country variation in output per maker
and the efﬁcacy of RSI.
The next step is to assume that
Æ
￿ is drawn from the Pareto distribution with scale pa-
11rameter
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varies across countries but not across parts. The cumulative density function for a Pareto














  is the minimum value. The use of


















































As can be seen from (9), the probability of using a local insider is a continuous function of
the parameters, .




probability that a maker in country
  imports part
  from the United States conditional on
not purchasing the part from a local insider. The overall probability that country
  imports
part






￿. Thus, evaluating U.S. exports at
their free-on-board (fob) prices, denoted
 fob
￿ , and letting
 
￿ represent total car production in
country
 , the expected value of U.S. exports of part








































































































































































































































￿, which is deferred until the regression analysis in Section 4, we discuss
the data used to estimate this regression speciﬁcation in the next section.
3 Data
Grouping the data into four categories—exports, car production, measures of the efﬁcacy
of relationship-speciﬁc investment and ﬁnally, concordance and description of parts,—we
document the sources and measurement of the variables used in this study.
3.1 Export Data
We downloaded highly disaggregated U.S. export data from the Center for International
Data maintained by Robert Feenstra at the University of California Davis. These data mea-
sure the fob value of parts exports, cover the 1989 to 1994 period, and are classiﬁed according
to the Harmonized System (HS). We searched the HS descriptions to locate every ten-digit
HS commodity category that involves automobile parts to obtain as complete a sample of ex-
ports as possible. Whenever possible, we conﬁned the sample to parts speciﬁcally intended
for passenger cars. In some cases even the most disaggregated HS codes do not distinguish
between types of motor vehicles. A complete list of the HS codes that comprise our sample




￿ denote the number of makers in country j, our model requires passenger car
production,
 








￿, by country. We estimate
 
￿ based on a
measure of the number of equal-sized makers as generated by the inverse of a Herﬁndahl
index for each country. The Herﬁndahl index for country j, denoted
 
￿, is derived from
output data for each maker in country
 . Since we consider the possibility that U.S. parts
exporters may be insiders in business relations with the foreign afﬁliates of U.S. makers, we
also require the share of passenger car production by country accounted for by subsidiaries
of thebig three U.S.-basedmakers at that time (GeneralMotors, Ford andChrysler). Werefer
to this measure as BIG3. The Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association of the United States
provides annual car production data for 26 countries. We restrict our sample to that set of
export markets. The same publication also provides the annual number of cars produced by
each maker in each country, including production by the overseas subsidiaries of General
Motors, Ford and Chrysler.
Table 1 lists the 26 countries with passenger car production together with an isocode
used to identify each country. Column (1) shows the average number of individual parts
imported by each of these countries across the six years of our sample. This average has an
upper bound of the number of parts, which is 53. In the data, the average ranges from 7.8
to 52.5 with more than half of the countries importing on average at least 40 different parts
each year. Column (2) lists each country’s share of U.S. exports (to the 26 countries) and
column (3) then provides each country’s share of world car production outside the United
14Table 1: Imports of U.S. Parts by Auto-Producing Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
























Canada (ca) 50.7 63.84 3.84 80.59 3.9 290
Mexico (mx) 52.5 21.8 2.4 57.09 4.8 146
Japan (jp) 52.2 4.22 30.85 0 5.2 1734
United Kingdom (uk) 52 1.84 4.51 42.86 4.4 299
German (de) 51.8 1.7 15.11 34.74 4.9 907
Austral (au) 52.2 1.24 1.07 60.75 3.6 87
Korea, South (kr) 49.7 0.88 4.38 0 2.7 475
Belgium (be) 50.5 0.83 1.05 100 1 308
France (fr) 50 0.64 10.9 0 2.8 1162
Brazil (br) 45.2 0.57 2.98 37.04 3.6 242
Netherlands (nl) 49.3 0.56 0.34 0 1 101
Taiwan (tw) 49.5 0.42 0.97 30.41 5 57
Italy (it) 48.2 0.32 5.34 0 1.7 907
Sweden (se) 46.5 0.23 1.09 0 1.7 188
China (cn) 37.5 0.16 0.45 0 2 68
Austria (at) 33 0.15 0.08 0 1 24
Spain (es) 43.2 0.15 6.14 38.44 4.8 373
Argentina (ar) 42.3 0.14 0.65 12.58 2.7 71
Turkey (tr) 38.3 0.12 0.74 2.36 2.2 101
USSR/CIS (ru) 24 0.06 3.97 0 3 386
India (in) 30 0.05 0.64 0 1.7 114
Malaysia (my) 24.5 0.04 0.39 0 1 114
Yugoslavia (yu) 19.7 0.02 0.48 0 2.8 52
Poland (pl) 20 0.01 0.89 0 1.8 143
Hungary (hu) 9 0.01 0.1 0 1 30
Czechoslovakia (cz) 7.8 0 0.65 0 1 188
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Figure 2: Car Production Shares and Shares of US Parts Exports
States. Column (4) reports BIG3. As the column shows, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler
produce cars in ten of the countries according to our data. Column (5) shows the number







￿. Our measure of local scale (in 1000s of cars per maker),
 
￿,
appears in column (6).
The relationship between each country’s share of car parts exports from the U.S. and its
share of non-U.S. car production (from columns (2) and (3) respectively of Table 1) is shown
in Figure 2. If each country imported U.S. parts in the same ﬁxed proportion to output then
the points would line up on the 45-degree line. We code each country into three categories of
BIG3, namely “No Big 3 Production”, “Minority Big 3” (less that 50% of output produced by
Ford, GM, and Chrysler afﬁliates) and “Majority Big 3.” Canada and Mexico are well above
the 45-degree line, and therefore have import shares much greater than production shares.
On the other hand, the former communist nations, the C.I.S. (ru), Czech Republic (cz), China
16(cn), Hungary (hu), and Yugoslavia (yu) import less than their car production share of U.S.
parts. Japan also lies below the 45-degree line.
3.3 Determinants of the efﬁcacy of RSI
Our formal theory does not specify the criteria determining which parts have high efﬁcacy
of RSI. One hypothesis is that vertical networks form to produce parts that have certain
technical characteristics associated with a greater need for RSI. This group would include
parts, such as engines, which involve costly investments in engineering and design that
are relevant mainly to a particular automaker. We implement this idea by using a rating
of the cost of engineering per part developed by Monteverde and Teece (1982) on the ba-
sis of information provided by a design engineer. This engineering cost rating, which we
refer to as ECR, rates the engineering cost of developing a given part for a new car model
on a 1 to 10 scale with 10 corresponding to the highest level. To the extent that these engi-
neering costs are speciﬁc to a maker, they would represent relationship-speciﬁc investments
and hence ECR can serve as a proxy for the efﬁcacy of RSI. There are no doubt other pos-
sible technical characteristics that enhance the potential for RSI for a particular part. For
example, relationship-speciﬁc investments could be important for achieving “just-in-time”
delivery, with the nature and extent of these investments varying over parts due to differing
requirements for packaging and transport. Since the Japanese auto producers were pioneers
in developing just-in time delivery, this type of RSI could be relatively more important for
Japan. We do not consider this possibility due to lack of data. Spencer and Qiu (2001) pro-
pose a further possibility (also not considered) that a higher efﬁcacy of RSI is associated with
parts that are more important part in the sense that they represent a greater share of the cost
17of an auto.
A second hypothesis of particular relevance for our analysis of keiretsu in Japan is that
a greater strength of network involvement in the production of a part may itself raise the
efﬁcacy of RSI for that part. Two features of vertical networks could be signiﬁcant here.
First, as detailed in our model, the formation of a vertical network ameliorates the hold-up
problem and hence raises the incentives for suppliers to engage in RSI. Secondly, the effect
of vertical networks in increasing the ﬂow of information between suppliers could suggest
new possibilities for relationship-speciﬁc investments and generally improve the efﬁciency
with which these investments are made. For any particular part, we hypothesize that the
strength of these effects will vary with the strength of network involvement as measured by
the degree to which producers of that part participate in the network. Taking this approach,
we can include the possibility that the group of parts produced with RSI in a vertical net-
work may be determined by historical or cultural factors in a particular country, not just the
technical characteristics of parts. Thus, under this hypothesis, a vertical network such as
keiretsu, could potentially raise the efﬁcacy of RSI for the parts they produce in Japan, but
these parts need not be the same as the parts produced by other vertical networks, such as in
the United States. Of course, there is also an alternative possibility, which we cannot address
with our data, namely that the vertical network is based on cronyism and does not generate
RSI. In this case, the preferential sourcing of parts from insiders would reduce rather than
raise the efﬁciency of production.
We develop three measures for the strength of network participation by part. Two of
these measures, INH-U and INH-J, measure the extent to which a part is produced in house
in the U.S. andJapan respectively and the third, KEI measures keiretsu involvement by part in
18Japan. Monteverde and Teece (1982) provide estimates of the share of in-house sourcing for
each part by General Motors and Ford. INH-U is then a single measure (by part) of in-house
production shares in the U.S., generated by taking a weighted average of the Monteverde
and Teece (1982) measures in which GM has two-thirds weight so as to roughly reﬂect its
production volume.
Our measures, INH-J and KEI, are derived using data from The Structure of the Japanese
Auto Parts Industry, 1990, by Dodwell Marketing Consultants. This book lists the major
Japanese suppliers of individual auto parts for each automobile manufacturer in Japan.
It identiﬁes whether the part is produced “in-house” and provides information as to the
“grouping” of each supplier. A supplier is considered to be in a particular maker’s group
based on the equity holdings of the maker, supplier reliance on the maker for 50% of its
sales, or other factors such as historical relationships or personnel ties. Following standard
terminology in the literature cited in the introduction, we refer to Dodwell’s “groupings” as
vertical keiretsu.
Deﬁning a “link” as a unique pairing of a maker and a major supplier, we count the
respective numbers of links involving in-house production and keiretsu for a given maker
and part. Dividing by the total links for each maker, we then obtain the share of in-house
links and keiretsu links per maker. Finally, to generate INH-J and KEI as single measures per
part, we calculate the weighted average across makers of the shares of in-house links and
keiretsu respectively using car production in 1996 as the weight. Since the links that form the
basis of our measures involve only suppliers located in Japan, our measures do not depend
directly on the level of imports of each part.
Using the example of mufﬂers, which has a large keiretsu presence, Table 2 illustrates the
19Table 2: Major suppliers of mufﬂers to the six largest automakers































Fraction in-house 0 0 0 0 0 1/3
Fraction keiretsu 2/2 1/1 1/2 1/4 2/3 0/3
Weight: 36% 18% 12% 8% 10% 8%
derivation of our INH-J and KEI variables. The table sets out the main suppliers of mufﬂers
(as deﬁned by Dodwell) for the makers (Toyota, Nissan etc) in Japan. We illustrate supply
links by in-house production with
￿
, supply by a keiretsu member, with
￿
, and supply by
an outsider with
￿
. The ﬁrst section lists the makers to show production in-house. For
the case of mufﬂers, Suzuki is the only maker to produce in-house. Since for Suzuki, there
are two other suppliers (Futaba and Sankei GK), its ratio of in-house links to total links is
1/3. Weighting by the fraction of output (8%) produced by Suzuki, INH-J (not shown) for
mufﬂers is 2.67%. The next group of suppliers, Sango to Hoei, represent ﬁrms that are part
of one of the makers’ keiretsu. However, it is interesting to note that some of these suppliers
also produce for makers outside their own keiretsu. Thus Futaba is part of the Toyota keiretsu,
but also produces for Honda, Mitsubishi and Suzuki. The ﬁnal two suppliers, Comex and
20Miyoshi, are outsiders that supply only Mazda. As can be seen from the table, there are only
two suppliers for Toyota (Sango and Futaba) and since they are both member of the Toyota
keiretsu, the number of keiretsu links relative to total links is 2/2 = 1. Weighting this fraction
by the share of output across the makers listed in the table (covering 92% of auto output),
we obtain KEI = 68.67/0.92 = 74.6%.5
We employ four proxies for the efﬁcacy of relationship-speciﬁc investment. None of
these measures vary across time. Table 3 deﬁnes the variables and displays their correla-
tions. Monteverde and Teece (1982) establish that the technical measure, ECR, is positively
related to GM and Ford’s decision to produce in house.6 We also observe this positive as-
sociation in our correlations: the weighted sum of the Ford and GM in-house production
share, INH-U, has a signiﬁcant and positive correlation with ECR. Interestingly, Japanese in-
house production as measured by INH-J has even stronger positive relationship with ECR.
These correlations indicate that parts with high engineering cost ratings tend to be produced
in-house. In contrast, the table shows that our other measure of the strength of network par-
ticipation, KEI, has virtually no correlation with ECR and a negative, but insigniﬁcant, corre-
lation with INH-J and INH-U. If all four proxies are driven by the same underlying reason for
RSI, then they should all be positively correlated. Leaving aside problems of measurement,
this suggests that parts produced with high keiretsu involvement are not associated with
high costs of engineering. Keiretsu-produced parts may be associated with some other tech-
nical characteristics, such as those involved with just-in-time delivery, but it is also possible
that they mainly reﬂect the outcome of historical and cultural factors in Japan.
5Accounting for links with the makers (Daihatsu, Fuji, Hino and Isuzu) not shown in the table, we obtain
KEI = 72.4% for mufﬂers. For concordance with the trade data, we combine mufﬂers with exhaust pipes. Since
KEI = 73.4% for exhaust pipes, we obtain KEI = 72.9% for the combined category.
6Monteverde and Teece (1982) convert the in-house production share into a binary variable and conduct
21Table 3: Correlations between proxies for the efﬁcacy of RSI
INH-J KEI INH-U ECR
INH-J: share of in-house links in Japan 1.000
(50)
KEI: share of keiretsu links in Japan -0.061 1.000
(50) (50)
INH-U: share of in-house purchases by GM and Ford 0.295
￿ -0.147 1.000
(39) (39) (41)
ECR: engineering cost rating (1-10) 0.602
￿ 0.015 0.333
￿ 1.000
(40) (40) (41) (42)




respectively. The number of observations used in the pairwise correlations are shown
in parentheses.
3.4 Concordance and Description of Parts
The different sources have unique ways of categorizing parts. The export data is identiﬁed
according to the Harmonized System (HS), whereas the data from Dodwell (1990) and Mon-
teverde and Teece (1982) reﬂect the categorization of the authors. We created a concordance
to combine the information from the difference sources. Based on an examination of the
data, we formed the 53 parts categories shown in Tables 4 and 5. These categories reﬂect
a level of aggregation equalling or exceeding the aggregation level in the various sources.
Thus, each of the part categories used in the different sources of data mapped to one of the
categories we devised. In cases where multiple part categories mapped to a single category
of ours, we summed the HS-level exports and averaged the RSI proxies.
Tables 4 and 5 portray some characteristics of the 53 parts. Column (1) shows the av-
erage number of countries that imported the part in the six years of our data. The column
probit regression analysis.
22Table 4: Top 25 Exported Parts Categories
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)











Engines 22 15.4 1.3 53.4 25 9
Transmissions 20.5 8.1 0.4 24 54.6 10
Body Stampings 14.2 8 0.2 8
Engine Parts 23.2 7.2 3.3 16.1 22.6 7.3
Wiring Sets 22 6.7 0.8 0 0.8 4
Tires 22.3 5.4 22.7 0 0
Brakes 21.3 5.2 1.6 5.2 34.8 5.7
Axles 22.3 4.9 0.6 49.2 31.3 10
Seat Parts 13.8 3.9 3.8 0 48.5 4
Bumpers 21.8 2.8 12.3 31 17.6 7
Wheels 21.2 2.6 9.7 7.3 29.2 5.7
Steering 20.2 2.5 0.5 13.8 38.5 7.1
Catalytic Converters 22.5 2.3 26.2 22.3 20.5 9
Mufﬂers+Exhaust Pipes 16.5 2 13.9 1.3 72.9 3
Safety Belts 14 1.7 0.4 0 17.8 3
Radios 22.5 1.7 4.5 0 4.5 5.7
Windshield Wipers 21.2 1.4 0.8 0 13.5 7
Gaskets 22.8 1.3 1.9 0 14.9
Radiators 19.5 1.2 1.2 0 27 8
Windows 19.8 1.2 5.9 0 6 1
Lighting 21 1.2 0.5 0 33.1 3.5
Fuel Pumps 22.8 1.1 0.9 1.3 49.9 6
Climate Control 19.7 1.1 7.2 6.6 47.5 5.7
Shock Absorbers 20.5 1.1 1.9 11.9 12 2
Starter Motors 20.5 1 16.1 0 35.8 7
23Table 5: Export Patterns for Other Parts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)











Alternators 20 0.8 1 0 35.8 7
Oil/Fuel Filters 22 0.7 2.1 0 51.6 1
Flasher Units 18.7 0.6 3.5 0 59.5
Intake Air Filters 22.3 0.5 12.2 0 34 4.3
Diesel Fuel Injectors 22.7 0.5 4.5 0 35.6
Batteries 17.2 0.5 0.7 0 0 2
Seats 18 0.5 2.8 12 42.7
Clutches 20.5 0.5 4.1 9.7 44.4
Mirrors 14 0.5 1.1 0 26.2 5
Meters 21.2 0.4 2.9 0 23.8 8
Brake Linings 18 0.4 0.9 0 11.9
Drive shafts 19.7 0.4 0.8 20.4 32.6 3
Cam/Crankshafts 18.7 0.3 0.8 39.7 16.9 9
Hinges 15.7 0.3 0.5 0 60.5 5
Locks 14.2 0.3 0.2 0 58.5 5.5
Spark Plugs 20.3 0.3 5.1 0 17.8 1
Ignition Coils 17.7 0.3 0.7 0 47.6 2
Distributors 11.5 0.3 0.4 0 41.6 6
Coil Springs 11.7 0.2 0.2 0 11.9 3
Fans 19.3 0.2 0.4 0 53.2 4
Body Shells 17.3 0.2 7.9
Horns 20.5 0.1 0.8 0 47.8 2
Furniture Parts 14.5 0.1 2.6 4.9 44.5 4.7
Flywheels+Pulleys 17.3 0.1 0.6 6.8 64.4
Rubber Mechanical Articles 14.2 0 6.4 0 0
Clocks 14.5 0 1.7 0 32.3 2
Chassis 13.8 0 1.8 6.8
Brake Hose 4.3 0 0.3 0 40.5
24reveals that the majority of parts were shipped to most of the 26 countries that produce au-
tomobiles. The parts are ordered by their share of the value of U.S. parts exports, as shown
in column (2). Engines top the list at 15.4%, followed by transmissions (8.1%) then body
stampings (8.0%). Column (3) displays Japan’s share of U.S. parts exports for each part.
This column reveals high Japanese imports of catalytic converters (26.2%), tires (22.7%), and
starter motors (16.1%). In contrast, Japanese purchases account for less than 1.3% of engines,
transmissions, and body stampings exports from the United States. The last three columns
contain data on the share of in-house links in Japan (INH-J), keiretsu links in Japan (KEI) and
engineering cost ratings (ECR). Due to incomplete data for our measures of engineering cost
and network participation (indicated by blanks in the table), the regressions we estimate use
at most 50 parts categories.
4 Regression Analysis
Recall that the model generated the following equation for the ratio of the value of U.S.
exports of part
  to country
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  from the United States conditional on the part not
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￿ equals one for Japan and zero otherwise. The ﬁrst term,
 
￿, will be absorbed
into a ﬁxed effect for each part in our regressions. If unique Japanese institutions raise the
efﬁcacy of RSI for all parts, then
 
￿ is positive. The interaction term,
 
￿, is positive if a greater
strength of network involvement in the production of a part is associated with an increase
in the Japanese advantage with respect to the efﬁcacy of RSI. We interact ECR with JPN to
test whether the engineering cost rating is associated with a higher efﬁcacy of RSI in Japan
as would be indicated by a positive value of
 













￿ , this is consistent with a direct role for
Japanese networks independent of the technical characteristics of parts.
We now examine the elements of
￿
￿
￿, which is the probability that a maker in country
 
would import part
  from the United States conditional on not purchasing part




￿ reﬂects the comparative advantage of the U.S. in each part together with the
trade costs associated with shipment to country
 . In addition, car makers may ﬁnd it easier
to meet U.S. safety and environmental standards if they obtain the relevant components
from U.S. based suppliers. Hence, we hypothesize that the propensity to import U.S. made
parts is increasing in the share of national car output exported to the U.S., as denoted by
X-US.7
We also include the possibility that U.S. parts exporters are insiders in business relations
with the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. makers. Since U.S. subsidiaries would then preferen-
7We thank Jerry Hausman for this suggestion.
26tially import parts from the United States, we hypothesize that
￿
￿
￿ is increasing in the share
of output made by U.S. subsidiaries in country
  (represented by BIG3). A further implica-
tion of the theory is that these subsidiaries would import relatively more RSI-intensive parts.
We test this proposition by interacting BIG3 with ECR as well as INH-U. If insiders produce
RSI-intensive parts and if U.S. parts suppliers are insiders when trading with U.S. foreign




































￿ denotes a part-speciﬁc term reﬂecting U.S. efﬁciency in part
 ,
 
￿ is a country-
speciﬁc term representing the trade costs of U.S. shipments to country
 , and NET
￿ takes
on the value INH-U
￿.
We use a number of variables to capture trade costs,
 
￿. Following standard practice in
gravity equations, we calculate the log of great-circle distance in miles between country
 ’s
major city and the population centroid of the U.S. (Kansas City: latitude 40N, longitude
95W). We also include indicator variables for countries that are English-speaking (Australia,
Canada, and the United Kingdom), communist in 1989 (China, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Poland, USSR/CIS, and Yugoslavia). We also add indicators for Canada and Mexico to
capture unique aspects such as trade arrangements (the 1965 Canada-U.S. Auto Pact and
maquiladora program launched by Mexico in the same year) and adjacency to the U.S. that
may explain their large volumes of imports as shown in Table1. Finally we include the log of
per capita GDP (1989–94 World Bank data), another standard variable in gravity equations.



































































































￿ is the ﬁxed effect





￿). The use of ﬁxed effects precludes direct estimation of the effects of our
proxies for the efﬁcacy of relationship-speciﬁc investment (reﬂected in
 
￿ from (13)). Based







are positive, the coefﬁcient on JPN and its interaction terms should be negative. Also, local
scale,
 
￿, enters negatively. The coefﬁcient (
 







￿) are hypothesized to be positive. Determinants of trade costs,
 
￿,
include distance, per capita income, dummies identifying English speaking and communist
countries and Canada and Mexico.
We estimate the model parameters using a panel of parts exports from 1989 to 1994 and
report the results in Table 6. All regressions include year-speciﬁc intercepts and we calculate
standards errors that are robust to the possibility of correlation across time for country-part





implied by the model. In this speciﬁcation, shown in column (1), the log of the ratio of coun-
try










￿, is a function of trade costs, per capita
income, and passenger car exports to the United States. It is consistent with the proposition
that each country imports parts from the U.S. in proportion to its production. As shown
8We use STATA’s robust cluster command.











￿ (U.S. exports per car)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln miles from U.S. 1.593
￿ 0.222 0.205 0.241 0.207 0.223
(0.204) (0.208) (0.211) (0.241) (0.210) (0.212)






































(0.580) (0.547) (0.536) (0.605) (0.535) (0.525)







(0.339) (0.309) (0.313) (0.351) (0.314) (0.302)
￿
￿



















(0.171) (0.173) (0.40) (0.181) (0.184)
KEI
￿ JPN -1.457 -1.310 -1.472 -2.341
￿











￿ JPN 0.078 0.258
(1.182) (1.172)
INH-J
￿ BIG3 1.696 1.702
(1.102) (1.105)
N 6177 6177 5895 4639 5895 5791
R
￿ 0.560 0.634 0.637 0.636 0.638 0.644
RMSE 1.73 1.578 1.557 1.569 1.556 1.542
Note: Standard errors robust to correlation within part-country clusters, are in parentheses with
￿,
￿, and
￿ denoting signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Sample period runs from
1989 to 1994. Year effects included but not reported.
29in column (1), this speciﬁcation indicates that Japanese imports are “too low.” Column (2),
portraying results when we add local scale,
 
￿, and BIG3, reveals that the negative Japan
effect is a consequence of failing to control for local scale effects which enter negatively and
signiﬁcantly. Once we add scale, Japan tends to import more than the model predicts (sig-
niﬁcant at the 10% level). The
 
￿ improves in this speciﬁcation and the estimated distance
coefﬁcient, perversely positive in column (1), now enters insigniﬁcantly. We also ﬁnd that
a country’s imports of U.S. auto parts rises with the BIG3 share of production. Columns
(3)–(6) in Table 6 show results when we add various interaction terms involving BIG3 and
JPN.
The result (from columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)) that Japan is a large importer of U.S. auto
parts does not support the hypothesis that Japanese institutions promote insider trade at the
expense of imports (from outsiders) for all parts. Japan’s larger than expected imports may
be explained by the fact that, relative to a number of the other countries which had high
tariffs and domestic content requirements, Japan has low formal trade barriers.9 Since tariffs
and other formal trade barriers are not used as controls in the model, it seems likely that
these omitted variables might helpexplain Japan’s high level of imports. Another possibility
is that Japan’s imports from the U.S. were unusually high due to pressure from the U.S.
government.10
Most of the coefﬁcients of the trade cost variables are sensible and signiﬁcant across the
speciﬁcations. Higher per capita income leads to higher parts imports. Per capita income
may capture differences in transportation infrastructure. English language contributes to
9For example, starting in 1984, Australia introduced an 85% domestic content requirement for autos and
tariffs on autos ranged from 45% in 1988 to 30% in 1994. See Truett and Truett (1997).
10In response to President George Bush’s trip to Japan in January 1992, Japanese automakers announced a
“voluntary” plan to double their 1990 purchases of U.S. auto parts by 1994. Actual purchases rose 30% from
1992 to 1993. See McMillan (1996).
30trade, whereas communist countries import fewer parts. Once we control for local scale in
columns (2)–(6), the distance coefﬁcient always has a positive sign but is not signiﬁcantly
different from zero. In regressions without the Canada and Mexico indicator variables, the
estimated coefﬁcient on distance is negative and signiﬁcant. Exports to the U.S., X-US,a r e
associated with greater imports of U.S. auto parts, a result consistent with the proposition
that nations import U.S. auto parts partly in order to comply with U.S. technical regulations.
It is also the case that Canada and Mexico import signiﬁcantly more than average. This
reﬂects a combination of geographic and trade policy factors.11
Column (3) displays results when we add KEI
￿JPN. It enters negatively but is not sig-
niﬁcant. These results indicate that Japan’s “greater than expected” level of imports may
not hold for parts with high levels of keiretsu participation. We add interactions using the
Monteverde and Teece measures of engineering cost ratings and U.S. in-house production
in column (4). None enter signiﬁcantly. In column (5) we exclude the Monteverde and Teece
variables that limit our sample (they are only available for 40 of our parts categories) and
instead use INH-J, a variable we found to be strongly correlated with the engineering cost
rating. Again, no interactions terms are signiﬁcantly different than zero.
Column (6) shows results utilizing the previous speciﬁcation but estimated without the
parts category “Mufﬂers+Exhaust Pipes”. From Table 4, “Mufﬂers+Exhaust Pipes” repre-
sents only 2% of the parts exported by the United States, but 13.9% of the parts imported by
Japan. This high level of imports may reﬂect the importance of U.S.-made exhaust systems
in ensuring that cars destined for the United States comply with U.S. emission standards.
Any such effect would not be fully captured by X-US, since it corrects only for the “aver-
11Note that our sample pre-dates NAFTA and that Canada and U.S. had essentially integrated markets in
autos and their parts due to the 1965 Canada-U.S. Auto Pact.
31age” relationship between imports of parts and exports of cars to the United States. When
“Mufﬂers+Exhaust Pipes” is excluded, we ﬁnd that keiretsu participation has a negative and
signiﬁcant impact on Japanese imports. The results do not indicate, however, that imports
of keiretsu-intensive parts are signiﬁcantly lower in Japan than other counties. According to
Table 4, the second highest KEI after “Mufﬂers+Exhaust Pipes” is for “Flywheels+Pulleys”.







plied by its value for KEI, 0.644, yields a small negative number -0.433.
The speciﬁcation used in Table 6 has the advantage that information from 40-50 parts is
combined to obtain the estimates of the responsiveness of U.S. exports to import-country
characteristics. It imposes the restriction that the only differences in coefﬁcients across parts
liein the ﬁxed effect and the interactions with JPN and BIG3. This leadsto efﬁcient estimation
if the assumption holds. However, there are plausible reasons to believe that coefﬁcients on
other variables might also vary across parts. For instance, as mentioned above, the import
sensitivity to X-US may vary across parts. In addition, differences in transportability should,
in all likelihood, lead to differences in distance and adjacency (Canada and Mexico) effects.
This could change our results of interest if there were, for instance, a correlation between
transportability and the proxies for the efﬁcacy of RSI.
We investigate the robustness of our results by using the following two-step method that
relaxes restrictions on the estimated coefﬁcients. In the ﬁrst step, instead of stacking the
parts and estimating ﬁxed effects, we estimate one equation per part. Thus all coefﬁcients
(not just the intercept) are allowed to vary from part to part. Since there is no variation
in the RSI proxies for a given part, the interactions involving NET and ECR are omitted in
the ﬁrst step. In the second step, we regress the estimated coefﬁcients for JPN and BIG3
32on our network and engineering cost rating measures of the efﬁcacy of RSI. These second-
step regressions have only one observation per part. The JPN and BIG3 coefﬁcients have
different standard errors that we use as (inverse) weights to correct for heteroskedasticity in
the second step regressions.12
The intercepts of the second-step regressions correspond to the coefﬁcients on JPN and
BIG3 shown in Table 6 and the slope coefﬁcients on NET and ECR correspond to coefﬁcients




























￿. Step one estimates
the term inside the parentheses. The second-step regression of these estimated coefﬁcients









￿ as the intercept and slope estimates.
We evaluate the part-speciﬁc regressions in step one by examining the mean across parts
of the estimated coefﬁcients. In all cases, the mean value corresponds very closely to the
estimates shown in Table 6 although we observe variation across parts in the estimates.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd evidence that the relationship between exports of “Mufﬂers+Exhaust
Pipes” and the explanatory variables differs dramatically from the rest of the sample. Specif-
ically, the estimates for every coefﬁcient for this part fall outside the 95% conﬁdence interval
surrounding the mean of the estimates of the other part categories. As previously hypothe-
sized, “Mufﬂers+Exhaust Pipes” exports are particularly sensitive to X-US.
Table 7 displays the results of second-step regressions that generate results correspond-
ing to the ﬁve columns ((2)–(6)) of Table 6. For each column, the estimates are derived from
two second-step regressions using estimated coefﬁcients for JPN and BIG3 from the step-one
regressions. The summary statistics (
 ,
 
￿, and RMSE) for each regression appear at the
12See Saxonhouse (1976) for a discussion of this method. We again use STATA’s robust cluster command to
obtain the ﬁrst-step standard errors.
33Table 7: Two-step regression results






























￿ JPN -0.591 -0.587
(1.491) (1.509)
INH-J
￿ BIG3 1.601 1.491
(1.294) (1.282)
Summary statistics for JPN coef. regressions
N 53 50 40 50 49
R
￿ 0.000 0.092 0.146 0.095 0.087
RMSE 1.378 1.328 1.294 1.34 1.357
Summary statistics for BIG3 coef. regressions
N 53 41 50 49
R
￿ 0.000 0.056 0.031 0.028
RMSE 1.154 1.162 1.087 1.075
Note: Estimated by weighted least squares (see explanation in text).




cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level.
34bottom of the table. The table indicates that the two-step procedure produces similar results
to those found previously. The coefﬁcient on JPN is positive and a bit larger and more signif-
icant than before. Now the variable KEI
￿JPN enters signiﬁcantly negative (5% level) for the
regressions that include “Mufﬂers+Exhaust Pipes” and this estimate does not change when
this part category is excluded. BIG3 countries are shown to import signiﬁcantly more U.S.
parts. The positive coefﬁcients on ECR
￿BIG3 and INH-J
￿BIG3 are consistent with the proposi-
tion that the BIG3 disproportionately import RSI-intensive parts but the these estimates are
not signiﬁcant.
5 Conclusion
We ﬁnd evidence that networks do matter for trade and that Japan is different. Far from
being a “closed” market, Japan imports more auto parts from the U.S. than its observable
characteristics (car production, scale, distance from U.S., etc.) would predict. We ﬁnd that
greater scale of host-country auto production deters parts imports, a result supporting the
model’s prediction that local scale increases the returns to relationship-speciﬁc investment.
Two results suggest that vertical networks matter for trade. First, U.S. exports to Japan
decrease as the importance of keiretsu sourcing of a part rises. Second, countries where the
Big 3 U.S. automakers account for large shares of car production tend to import more parts
from the United States.
A preference for insiders over outsiders results in our model from endogenous deci-
sions by insiders to conduct relationship-speciﬁc investment. Insider networks may reﬂect
technical characteristics of parts that give rise to a high efﬁcacy of RSI or may themselves
generate greater efﬁcacy of RSI. In this context, rather than being exclusionary, networks
35can be a source of greater efﬁciency in production. Our results are consistent with this view
of networks but further evidence would be required to reject the hypothesis that particu-
lar networks, such as keiretsu in Japan, reﬂect cronyism. Since vertical keiretsu links are not
correlated with engineering cost ratings, they do not appear to reﬂect technical efﬁciency,
at least as far as we can measure it. Thus, the economic basis for cross-part variation in the
prominence of keiretsu remains a puzzle that merits further investigation.
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